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E-VERIFY: AN EXCEPTIONALIST SYSTEM 
EMBEDDED IN THE IMMIGRATION 
REFORM BATTLE BETWEEN FEDERAL  
AND STATE GOVERNMENTS 
Shelly Chandra Patel* 
Abstract: The immigration debate has proven to be fertile ground for 
promoting exceptionalist practices, where certain groups of people are 
isolated from the rest of the population and regarded as a subclass. The 
federal electronic employment verification system, E-Verify, is a prime ex-
ample of such a practice. Passed under the Procurement Act, the goal of 
E-Verify was to promote efficiency and economy in government procure-
ment. Unfortunately, the system falls far short of these goals because of 
problems inherent in the electronic database and increased state in-
volvement over immigration reform. E-Verify is often criticized as unreli-
able because it relies on inaccurate databases, imposes an undue financial 
burden on employers, and leaves immigrant workers vulnerable to subjec-
tive determinations about their legal status. While Congress works on re-
solving these issues, the legal landscape is nevertheless changing as states 
enact and enforce their own immigration laws, including those that man-
date the use of E-Verify. State entry into the immigration arena not only 
expands the reach of the system’s problems, but it also threatens to le-
gitimize the exclusion of immigrants, documented or undocumented. 
This Comment describes how the implementation of E-Verify has frus-
trated the goals of efficiency and economy, and argues that Congress 
should establish definitive boundaries between state and federal immigra-
tion reform to restore the political imbalance. 
Introduction 
 On February 11, 2009, Julian Mora was taking his regular route to 
work when, without provocation, a vehicle from the Maricopa County 
Sherriff’s Office (MCSO) pulled up behind him while another cut in 
front of him.1 After forcing him to stop abruptly, MCSO deputies ques-
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2009–2010). 
1 Brief for Plaintiffs Julio and Julian Mora at 6, Mora v. Arpaio, No. 209 Civ. 01719 (D. 
Ariz. Aug. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 3488718; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues Maricopa County 
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tioned Mora about his destination but failed to proffer any explanation 
for the stop.2 Cooperating with the deputies, Mora informed them that 
he was going to work at Handyman Maintenance, Inc. (HMI) and pro-
vided a valid Arizona driver’s license.3 MCSO deputies ordered Mora 
and his nineteen-year-old son, Julio, out of their vehicle.4 Without sus-
picion of any criminal activity, the deputies proceeded to frisk and 
handcuff them.5 Julio asked for an explanation but was given no an-
swers.6 Although there was no reason to believe that the Moras were in 
the country illegally, MCSO deputies transported them to the HMI 
worksite, where MCSO was conducting a raid.7 
 At the worksite, MCSO personnel, allegedly carrying semiauto-
matic rifles, had already detained all HMI employees for interrogation.8 
Detainees were never informed of their constitutional right to legal ad-
vice; on the contrary, they were forbidden from using their cell phone.9 
 The ordeal was especially degrading for Julian who, as a diabetic, 
had difficulty controlling his bladder.10 The deputies, however, denied 
his repeated requests to use the restroom.11 It was not until Mora told 
the deputies that he would have to relieve himself in front of everyone 
that they escorted him to the parking lot, where he urinated behind a 
                                                                                                                      
Sherriff’s Office for Illegal Arrest and Detention of US Citizen and Legal Resident (Aug. 19, 
2009) (on file with ACLU). 
2 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 6. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 Id. 
7 Press Release, ACLU, supra note 1. 
8 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 7. Allegedly, Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio 
routinely relies on Arizona’s draconian employer sanction laws to raid businesses and 
question all employees for purported violations related to their immigration status. See 
Paul Giblin, Arizona Sheriff Conducts Immigration Raid at City Hall, Angering Officials, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 18, 2008, at A10 (indicating that “60 heavily armed sheriff’s deputies” raided 
City Hall in Mesa, Arizona, at 2 a.m. and arrested three people whom they “suspected [of 
being] illegal immigrants working as janitors”); see also Megan Boehnke & JJ Hensley, Sher-
iff’s Office Raids Gold Canyon Candle Company, Ariz. Republic, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www. 
azcentral.com/community/chandler/articles/2008/09/10/20080910chandlerraid0910-ON. 
html (noting that “[d]eputies held 300 employees for about six hours . . . refusing to let 
anyone in or out,” resulting in “65 arrests”); Jackee Coe & JJ Hensley, Sheriff’s Deputies Raid 
Mesa Landscaping Business, Ariz. Republic, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/ 
news/articles/2008/08/27/20080827immig-landscaping0827-ON.html (reporting that depu-
ties handcuffed workers (including U.S. citizens) until they could check for immigration 
documents). 
9 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 7. 
10 Press Release, ACLU, supra note 1. 
11 Id. 
2010] The E-Verify System and State & Federal Immigration Reform 455 
car.12 Shortly thereafter, when Julio asked to use the bathroom, a dep-
uty took him to a proper facility but refused to un-cuff his hands.13 
Watching the young man struggle with his hands tied together, the 
deputy mocked him, saying, “[w]hat’s the matter, you can’t find it?”14 
When he returned from the restroom, Julio asked another deputy if he 
could leave because he was not an HMI employee.15 He was told he 
could leave only after he got to the front of the line and verified his 
immigration status, nearly three hours later.16 
 Workplace raids and detentions, such as the one described above 
at the HMI worksite, provide a contemporary example of how various 
cities and towns across the country are increasingly structuring society 
“along the lines of ‘the exception’” to deal with the immigration cri-
sis.17 In her book The Law into Their Own Hands: Immigration and the Poli-
tics of Exceptionalism, Roxanne L. Doty defines exceptionalism as a phe-
nomenon in which certain individuals or groups are “segmented from 
the general population and denied the rights and protections accorded 
to the rest of the population.”18 At its core, exceptionalism creates a 
group of “others,” considered to be “potential enemies.”19 
 Doty examines the “attrition through enforcement” strategy em-
braced by several states to prevent undocumented migrants from “em-
bed[ding] themselves” in their communities and eventually forcing 
                                                                                                                      




16 Id. at 9. On August 19, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of 
Arizona filed a lawsuit challenging the illegal arrest and detention of the Moras by MSCO 
deputies. See Press Release, ACLU, supra note 1. Because these arbitrary detentions prevent 
law-abiding citizens and legal residents from going about their business without govern-
ment interference, the complaint alleges that MSCO deputies violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Brief for Plaintiffs, supra 
note 1, at 7; Press Release, ACLU, supra note 1. 
17 See Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Law into Their Own Hands: Immigration and 
the Politics of Exceptionalism 83, 94 (2009) (noting that although the U.S. Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) directed its “Operation Return to Sender” 
raids at criminals, they resulted in numerous “collateral catches” of undocumented mi-
grants who were not intended targets). Headlines about such raids have become com-
monplace. See Nina Bernstein, Immigrants Go from Farms to Jails, and a Climate of Fear Settles 
In, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2006, at 21; Judy Keen, Effects of Raid Still Felt in Iowa Town, USA 
Today, Feb. 12, 2007, at 3A; Sylvia Moreno, Immigration Raid Leaves Texas Town a Skeleton, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 2007, at A2; Julia Preston, Immigrants’ Families Figuring Out What to Do 
After Federal Raids, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2006, at A13. 
18 Doty, supra note 17, at 84. 
19 See id. 
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them to either leave the country or relocate to another city.20 The vol-
untary federal electronic verification program (E-Verify) provides a 
contemporary example of this practice.21 E-Verify is an Internet-based 
database operated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 
partnership with the Social Security Administration (SSA), which allows 
employers to electronically verify an employee’s work eligibility.22 
 The principal grant of legislative authority on which President 
George W. Bush relied in expanding the scope of E-Verify was the Fed-
eral Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (“Procurement 
Act”).23 The Procurement Act’s express purpose is to provide an “eco-
nomical and efficient system” of government procurement.24 Accord-
ingly, the President may “prescribe policies and directives that [he or 
she] considers necessary,” as long as these directives are “consistent 
with” the Procurement Act’s provisions.25 Despite its vagueness, the 
Procurement Act does not give the President unlimited authority to 
make decisions that he believes will result in savings to the govern-
ment.26 Instead, it qualifies Presidential directives with the goals of 
“economy” and “efficiency.”27 
 The terms “economy” and “efficiency,” however, are not narrowly 
construed.28 In addition to price, they include factors such as the qual-
ity of goods or services, their suitability for government purposes, and 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Doty, supra note 17, at 83, 85 (arguing that the proliferation of border vigilante 
groups and the subsequent expansion of their mission beyond “the physical patrolling of 
the US-Mexico border, has been a major factor in the unprecedented grassroots move-
ment against undocumented migrants”). 
21 See id.; U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., E-Verify Supplemental Guide 
for Federal Contractors 18 (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov (follow “E-Verify 
Homepage” hyperlink; then follow “Information for Federal Contractors” hyperlink; then 
follow “E-Verify Supplemental Guidance for Federal Contractors” hyperlink). 
22 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 21. 
23 See 40 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Federal Acquisition Regulations for Employment Eligibil-
ity Verification, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,651 (Nov. 14, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 2, 22, 
52). 
24 40 U.S.C. § 101. 
25 Id. § 121(a). 
26 See Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 793 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (“[The Court’s] decision does not write a blank check for the President to fill in at 
his will. The procurement power must be exercised consistently with the structure and 
purposes of the statute that delegates that power.”) (citation omitted). 
27 See 40 U.S.C. § 101; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 
1981) (requiring a “reasonably close nexus” between the Executive Order and the Pro-
curement Act’s policy goals of “ensuring efficiency and economy in government procure-
ment”). 
28 See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 789. 
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their availability in the market.29 The broad nature of this power allows 
the President to implement any social or economic goal he sees fit, 
provided that there is some conceivable connection, no matter how 
attenuated, to the goals of the Procurement Act.30 Courts therefore 
routinely defer to the President’s findings insofar as his directives pro-
mote “efficiency” and “economy.”31 
 The issue of whether a presidential directive, like E-Verify, is effec-
tive in meeting its objective is beyond judicial scrutiny.32 Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that the system is broken.33 Congress’s recent decision 
to reauthorize E-Verify as a voluntary program, rather than a manda-
tory one, demonstrates its own reservations.34 Because the system relies 
on flawed databases, mandatory participation will cripple American 
businesses and workers by driving “workers from tax-paying, above-
board work into the underground, black market, cash economy.”35 
 While Congress debates federal immigration reform and the role 
of E-Verify, the legal landscape at both the state and local levels is 
changing.36 With no clear pathway to reform in sight, local communi-
ties have begun to enact their own immigration-related ordinances.37 
Although these ordinances propose solutions to the immigration crisis, 
they undermine the democratic fabric of our society because they “at-
tribute worth to human beings” on the basis of having or not having 
certain documents.38 By denying immigrants access to jobs, identifica-
tion, housing, and education, state and local governments “fan the 
flames” of xenophobic sentiments.39 These laws not only promote de-
fensive hiring practices, but they also incite state and local police offi-
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 805–06 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
31 See id. at 789 (upholding President Carter’s Executive Order requiring contractors 
to use certain wage-and-price standards); see also City of Albuquerque v. U.S. Dep’t of Inte-
rior, 379 F.3d 901, 914 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Procurement Act is a “broad dele-
gation of authority” and upholding the Executive Order at issue). 
32 See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 807 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
33 See Press Release, Nat’l Immigration Forum, Congress Passes DHS Appropriations 
Devoid of Wedge Issue Immigration Amendments (Oct. 21, 2009) (on file with author). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See Julia Preston, Surge in Immigration Laws Around U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2007, at 
A2 (noting that in 2006 there were eighty-four laws passed regarding immigration issues). 
37 See Emily Bazar, Illegal Immigrants Moving Out, USA Today, Sept. 27, 2007, at 3A. 
38 See Doty, supra note 17, at 84. 
39 See id. at 85, 90–91. 
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cers to improperly prosecute immigrants, affecting legally documented 
migrants like the Moras.40 
 This Comment, through an examination of E-Verify, argues that 
Congress, and not the states, should enforce existing immigration laws 
and enact laws that clearly circumscribe when state and local govern-
ments can assist the federal government. Part I provides a brief over-
view of the E-Verify program. Part II explains how the E-Verify program 
frustrates the Procurement Act’s goals of ensuring efficiency and econ-
omy. Part III discusses how states are transforming the legal landscape 
by enacting and enforcing their own immigration laws, including those 
governing the use of E-Verify. Because these laws expand the use of E-
Verify, they compound the systemic problems inherent in the federal 
program and further frustrate the goals of the Procurement Act. Fi-
nally, Part IV proposes that Congress should assert greater control in 
the immigration arena to resolve the inefficiencies brought about 
through the implementation of E-Verify. 
I. What Is E-Verify? 
A. The Origins of E-Verify 
 The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 im-
poses employment-related restrictions on immigrants by requiring em-
ployers to inspect and verify the authenticity of certain documents pro-
vided by prospective employees.41 After reviewing these documents, 
employers must attest to an employee’s eligibility by completing a Form 
I-9.42 With at least twenty-six documents available to demonstrate eligi-
                                                                                                                      
40 See Karla M. McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting Immi-
grants, 31 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 579, 589 (2009); see also Press Release, ACLU, Over 
500 Organizations Demand White House End Flawed State and Local Immigration En-
forcement Program (Aug. 27, 2009) (on file with ACLU) (“Since its inception the 287(g) 
program has drawn sharp criticism . . . because it has led to illegal racial profiling and civil 
rights abuses, including the unlawful detention and deportation of U.S. citizens and per-
manent residents, while diverting scarce resources from traditional local law enforcement 
functions and distorting immigration enforcement policies.”). 
41 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1), (b)(1) 
(2006); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 148–49 (2002) (holding 
that the IRCA foreclosed an employer from awarding backpay to an undocumented migrant 
who was not legally authorized to work in the United States); Ann Marie O’Donovan, Immi-
grant Workers and Workers’ Compensation After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 299, 300 (2006). 
42 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2008). There is no require-
ment that an employer file the Form I–9 with a federal agency; the employer must, how-
ever, retain it for inspection by federal officials. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2); U.S. Citizen-
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bility, many of which are prone to fraud and forgery, it was difficult for 
employers to differentiate between the documented and undocu-
mented immigrant.43 Consequently, the IRCA did not adequately fulfill 
its goals of increasing job security for U.S. citizens and curbing unau-
thorized employment.44 
 In response to a growing population of undocumented migrants, 
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Re-
sponsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996.45 Under the IIRIRA, the federal gov-
ernment rolled out the Basic Pilot/Employment Eligibility Verification 
Program, allowing employers to confirm a new hire’s eligibility via an 
electronic verification system.46 This supplement to the paper based I-9 
system was initially only available in the five states with the largest un-
documented populations: California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and 
Texas.47 By 2003, all fifty states were participating in the pilot program.48 
 In 2007, the Bush administration enhanced the internal enforce-
ment of immigration laws.49 This effort rebranded the Basic Pi-
lot/Employment Eligibility Verification Program as the E-Verify Pro-
gram.50 Under this program, the employer enters an employee’s social 
security number, date of birth, and citizenship status into the E-Verify 
website.51 The system then verifies this information against the infor-
mation contained in the SSA and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
                                                                                                                      
ship & Immigration Servs., Form I–9, Employment Eligibility Verification, available at http:// 
www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf. 
43 See The Human Resource Initiative for a Legal Workforce: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 63 (2007) (statement of Susan 
R. Meisinger, Pres. and CEO of the Society for Human Resource Management) [hereinaf-
ter Legal Workforce Hearing]; U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 42. 
44 See Electronic Verification of Employee Eligibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Govern-
ment Management, Organization and Procurement of the Comm. on H. Oversight and Government 
Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Jean Baker McNeill, Policy Analyst, The Heritage 
Foundation) [hereinafter Employee Eligibility Hearing] (noting that the failure of the IRCA 
was due, at least in part, to the ease with which immigrants could obtain forged documents 
to show that they were employment eligible); see also Maria Trevino, Assimilation Key to Im-
migration Reform, USA Today, Feb. 9, 2007, at 15A (noting that the failure to enforce vigor-
ously employer sanctions was among the reasons the IRCA was unsuccessful). 
45 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a 
(1996); Lindsay L. Chichester & Gregory P. Adams, The State of E-Verify: What Every Employer 
Should Know, Fed. Law., Jul. 2009, at 50, 50. 




50 Id. at 51. 
51 Federal Acquisition Regulations for Employment Eligibility Verification, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 33,376 (proposed June 12, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 12, 22, and 52). 
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Services (USCIS) databases.52 Additionally, the government pledged to 
expand both civil and criminal investigations of employers who hire 
unauthorized workers.53 In particular, it sought to increase civil fines by 
approximately twenty-five percent and bolster the enforcement efforts 
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.54 
 The Administration also launched a rulemaking process to man-
date that all contractors and subcontractors doing business with the 
federal government use E-Verify not only for new hires but also for ex-
isting employees.55 In fact, on June 6, 2008, President Bush signed Ex-
ecutive Order 13,465 which instructs: 
Executive departments and agencies that enter into contracts 
shall require, as a condition of each contract, that the contrac-
tor agree to use an electronic employment eligibility verifica-
tion system designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to verify the employment eligibility of: (i) all persons hired 
during the contract term by the contractor to perform em-
ployment duties within the United States; and (ii) all persons 
assigned by the contractor to perform work within the United 
States on the Federal contract.56 
B. A Change in the Scope of E-Verify 
 The SSA indicated that approximately 137,000 employers were 
participating in the E-Verify program as of July 11, 2009.57 Participation 
in the program is likely to grow as federal and state governments adopt 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. If the SSA database cannot verify an employee’s citizenship status, the query will 
then run through the USCIS database, which maintains employment eligibility informa-
tion for immigrant workers. Id. 
53 See Press Release, Dep’t Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Improving Border Security and 
Immigration Within Existing Law (Aug. 10, 2007) (on file with author). 
54 See id. (noting that as of July 31, 2007, ICE had made 742 criminal arrests in connec-
tion with its investigations of employers who hire undocumented migrants). 
55 See id. (indicating that with more than 200,000 companies doing business with the 
federal government, it “ought to lead by example. . . . and make it more difficult for illegal 
immigrants to obtain jobs”). 
56 Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,285–86 ( June 11, 2008) (amending Exec. Or-
der No. 12,989). The Bush Administration passed the regulation on November 14, 2008. See 
Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,651 (Nov. 14, 2008) (to be 
codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 22, and 52). The regulation went into effect on September 8, 2009. 
See Press Release, Dep’t Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Strengthens Employment Veri-
fication with Administration’s Commitment to E-Verify ( July 8, 2009) (on file with author). 
57 See Employee Eligibility Hearing, supra note 44 (statement of David A. Rust, Deputy 
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.). 
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procurement policies of only soliciting contractors that agree to use E-
Verify.58 
 State laws have taken on a variety of iterations of the federal law.59 
Some states, like Missouri and Nebraska, require participation by state 
governments and agencies only.60 But others—including Arizona, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina—have gone a step further by 
making the verification system mandatory for private businesses as 
well.61 The impact of E-Verify is even noticeable at the local govern-
ment level.62 In 2007, Mission Viejo, California passed a law obligating 
the city and city contractors to verify work eligibility via E-Verify.63 
 This cornucopia of local ordinances and state laws has imposed a 
new dimension in addition to the federal program.64 Because it shifts 
the focus from the undocumented migrant to the unscrupulous em-
ployer, the effects of the once voluntary program are not confined to 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Chichester & Adams, supra note 45, at 53; Press Release, Dep’t Homeland Sec., 
supra note 53. 
59 See Nat’l Assoc. of Gov’t Contractors, E-Verify Legislation Guide, http://www. 
formi9nagc.com/E-Verify_Summary.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
60 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.530(3) (2009) (“All public employers shall enroll and ac-
tively participate in a federal work authorization program.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 4-114(2) 
(2009) (“Every public employer and public contractor shall register with and use a federal 
immigration verification system to determine the work eligibility status of new employees 
physically performing services within the State of Nebraska.”). 
61 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(A) (2009); Ga. Code Ann. § 13-10-91 (2009) 
(“No public employer shall enter into a contract . . . for the physical performance of ser-
vices within this state unless the contractor registers and participates in the federal work 
authorization program to verify information of all newly hired employees or subcontrac-
tors.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-3 (2008) (“Every employer shall register with and utilize 
the status verification system to verify the federal employment authorization status of all 
newly hired employees.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-8-20(B) (2008) (providing that “all private 
employers . . . must: (1) register and participate in the E-Verify federal work authorization 
program, or its successor, to verify information of all new employees”). 
62 Chichester & Adams, supra note 45, at 53. 
63 See Mission Viejo, Cal., Code of Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 2.80, § 2.80.030 (2007). 
The ordinance requires: 
As a condition for the award or renewal of any City contract . . . to a Business 
Entity or Contractor after July 1, 2007 for which the reasonable value of em-
ployment, labor, or personal services shall exceed $15,000, the Business Entity 
or Contractor shall enroll in the Basic Pilot Program and thereafter shall pro-
vide the City documentation affirming its enrollment and participation in the 
Basic Pilot Program. The Business Entity or Contractor shall be required to 
continue its participation in the Basic Pilot Program throughout the course of 
its business relationship with the City. 
Id. 
64 See Chichester & Adams, supra note 45, at 50. 
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those without proper documentation.65 As these ordinances become 
commonplace, local residents begin to view immigrants as enemies, 
eventually leading to the dissolution of entire migrant communities.66 
Essentially, the current state of E-Verify is reconfiguring immigration 
policy around the state of exception.67 
II. The Problems with E-Verify 
 In a recent federal court decision, Chamber of Commerce v. Napoli-
tano, a Federal District of Maryland Court upheld the validity of Execu-
tive Order 13,465, which mandated that federal contractors use the E-
Verify system.68 The court explained that the President has broad dis-
cretion to regulate government contracting under the Procurement 
Act as long as the directive provides “an economical and efficient sys-
tem” of government procurement.69 
 Although Executive Order 13,465 is valid, the E-Verify system is a 
“half–hearted and flawed” approach to immigration reform.70 Critics 
frequently note that the system is unreliable and unduly burdensome 
because it relies on inaccurate databases, imposes a financial burden on 
employers without reducing potential liability, and invites invidious dis-
crimination.71 Thus, even if the Procurement Act purportedly provides 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Doty, supra note 17, at 99 (noting that the anti-immigrant ordinance introduced 
in Hazelton, Pennsylvania forced local store owners to close their businesses because their 
client base consisted mostly of recent immigrants); Nat’l Assoc. of Gov’t Contractors, supra 
note 59. 
66 See Doty, supra note 17, at 99. 
67 See id. 
68 See Chamber of Commerce v. Napolitano, 648 F. Supp. 2d 726, 737–38 (D. Md. 
2009); Exec. Order No. 13,465 § 3, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,285–86 ( June 11, 2008) (amending 
Exec. Order No. 12,989 § 5). On June 9, 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting 
pursuant to Executive Order 13,465, designated E-Verify as the “electronic employment 
eligibility verification system to be used by Federal contractors.” See Designation of the 
Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification System Under Exec. Order No. 12,989, 73 
Fed. Reg. 33,837 ( June 13, 2008). 
69 See 40 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Napolitano, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. To support a find-
ing for a reasonably close nexus, the Napolitano court required nothing more than the 
President’s reasonable and rational explanation of how an Executive Order promotes effi-
ciency and economy. See Napolitano, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 738. 
70 See Employment Verification System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees 
and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. 
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Secu-
rity) [hereinafter Employment Verification Hearing]. 
71 See id. 
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the basis for the Executive Order, the practical implementation of the E-
Verify system undermines the policy goals of efficiency and economy.72 
A. Lack of Accurate and Reliable Databases 
 A major problem with E-Verify is that it relies on the flawed data-
bases of the SSA.73 In 2008, Intel Corporation reported that the system 
erroneously identified twelve percent of its new hires as employment 
ineligible.74 As a result of its own investigation, the SSA estimated 
nearly 17.8 million discrepancies in its database.75 With such a large 
margin of error, nearly 2.5 million legal residents are at risk of losing 
their jobs as a result of being misidentified as an unauthorized work-
er.76 
 Supporters of the system note that approximately 96.9% of queries 
confirm that the employee has authorization to work.77 The remaining 
3.1% of all queries resulted in a Tentative Nonconfirmation (TNC), 
indicating that the employee’s information does not correspond with 
the information in the SSA or Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) databases.78 If the query results in a TNC, the employer must 
notify the employee and initiate a referral to the SSA so that the em-
ployee can resolve the discrepancy.79 Nevertheless, from the time the 
employer refers the employee to the SSA, the employee has only eight 
business days to settle the nonconfirmation.80 
 The USCIS reported that successful resolution results in only 0.3% 
of all TNC cases.81 Of the remaining 2.8% of TNCs, final nonconfirma-
tion for an eligible employee often results when the employee did not 
follow proper procedures to contest or, alternatively, was not aware of 
                                                                                                                      
72 See 40 U.S.C. § 101; Chamber of Commerce v. Napolitano, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38; Em-
ployment Verification Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Chair-
man, Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security). 
73 Chichester & Adams, supra note 45, at 51. 
74 See Employment Verification Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold). 
75 Office of the Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., No. A-08-06-216100, Cong-
ressional Response Report: Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s 
Numident File 2 (2006). 
76 Jaime Contreras, How About E-Trust?, Wash. Times, Sept. 25, 2009, at A20. 
77 See Employment Verification Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Michael Aytes, Acting 
Deputy Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) (noting that statistics from 
October through December 2008 provide the basis for the 96.9% figure). 
78 See id. 
79 Chichester & Adams, supra note 45, at 51. 
80 See id. 
81 Employment Verification Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Michael Aytes, Acting 
Deputy Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services). 
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either the TNC or the opportunity to contest because his employer 
failed to initiate a SSA referral.82 In a country with an eligible working 
population (defined as individuals between the ages of eighteen and 
sixty–five) of approximately 190 million, a margin of error of even one 
percent is troublesome.83 The difficult question, and one that currently 
remains unanswered, is what recourse is available to legal residents who 
are subject to final nonconfirmation under the E-Verify system?84 
B. Unreasonable and Disproportionate Costs for Employers 
 Although E-Verify is a “free, Internet-based system,” participation 
in the program is hardly without its costs.85 In fact, the Final Employ-
ment Eligibility Verification Rule (Final Rule) estimated that employ-
ers’ startup costs for compliance with the requirement would total $188 
million in fiscal year 2009 alone.86 
 To comply with Final Rule, an employer must enter into an E-
Verify Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DHS and SSA.87 
The MOU stipulates that the employer must periodically allow DHS 
and SSA “to review Forms I-9 and other employment records and to 
interview the employer and its employees regarding the [e]mployer’s 
                                                                                                                      
82 See id. An independent examination of the E-Verify program disclosed that many re-
cently naturalized citizens are subject to misidentification. See id. Although the USCIS 
notes that it instituted an automated check with its naturalization data to reduce such 
mismatches, these “enhancements” only affect a small percentage of TNCs, and they do 
not prevent the initial TNC. See id. 
83 Employment Verification Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Michael Aytes, Acting 
Deputy Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services); U.S. Census Bureau, The 
Resident Population by Age and Sex, 2009, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab (follow 
“Population” hyperlink; then follow “Resident Population by Age and Sex PDF” hyper-
link). 
84 Interview with Francis Chin, Partner, Chin & Curtis LLP, in Boston, Mass. (Oct. 15, 
2009). 
85 See Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,702 (Nov. 14, 2008) 
(to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 22, and 52); U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra 
note 21, at 4. 
86 See Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,702. Notably, 
the $188 million figure exceeds the cost initially anticipated in the proposed rule by ap-
proximately $127 million. Compare Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule, 73 Fed. 
Reg. at 67,702, with Federal Acquisition Regulations for Employment Eligibility Verifica-
tion, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,376 (proposed June 12, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 12, 
22, and 52) (approximating total startup and training costs to be $62 million for fiscal year 
2009). 
87 See Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,651 (noting 
that the terms of the MOU, as established by the USCIS, are non-negotiable and that any 
violation of these terms may lead to termination of the employer’s participation in E-
Verify). 
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use of E-Verify.”88 By signing the MOU before enrolling in the E-Verify 
Program, the employer consents to the release of records that may be 
beyond the scope of immigration matters.89 
 Even those employers who scrupulously follow verification proce-
dures face the possibility of a DHS audit or raid.90 The Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids of six Swift & Co. processing 
plants in December 2006 provide a compelling example of potential 
liability.91 Resulting in arrests of 1282 legal and illegal immigrants, the 
raid not only disrupted the workforce but also cost the company more 
than $50 million.92 In a testimony before the House Judiciary Commit-
tee in April 2007, Jack Shadley, Senior Vice President of Swift & Co., 
noted that the company had been participating in E-Verify since 1997.93 
Yet, many ineligible employees slipped through cracks, not through any 
wrongdoing by the company but because of the system’s inability to 
identify fraudulent documents.94 Cases like this raise doubts as to 
whether the “rebuttable presumption,” that an E-Verify participant did 
not knowingly hire an ineligible employee, affords any meaningful pro-
tection.95 
                                                                                                                      
88 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., The E-Verify Program for Employment 
Verification Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (2008), avaliable at http://www. 
uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/MOU.pdf. 
89 See id.; Interview with Francis Chin, supra note 84. 
90 Ensuring a Legal Workforce: What Changes Should Be Made to Our Current Employment Ve-
rification System?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the 
Comm. on S. Judiciary, 110th Cong. (statement of Lynden Melmed, former Chief Counsel of 
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91 See id. 
92 See Preston, supra note 17; Henry C. Jackson, Raids Could Force Meatpackers to Raise 
Worker Pay, Chi. Trib., Dec. 5, 2008, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/dec/05 
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93 See Current Employment Verification Hearing, supra note 90 (statement of Lynden 
Melmed, former Chief Counsel of USCIS) (quoting Mr. Shadley’s prior testimony that “[i]t 
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94 See Legal Workforce Hearing, supra note 43 (statement of Susan R. Meisinger, President 
and CEO of the Society for Human Resource Management); Valerie Richardson, Meatpack-
ers’ Union Sues Over Illegal Alien Raids, Wash. Times, Sept. 15, 2007, at A2 (noting that, of 
the workers arrested, 274 faced criminal charges for identity theft). 
95 See Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,652 (Nov. 14, 
2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 22, and 52) (noting that where E-Verify confirms 
the identity of an employee, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the employer 
that it did not knowingly hire an unauthorized worker); Jackson, supra note 92. 
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 The conjunctive imposition of periodic visits and unfettered access 
to records will increase employers’ exposure to fines and penalties.96 
Civil penalties range from $375 to $16,000 for every ineligible em-
ployee hired and from $110 to $1100 for Form I-9 errors and omis-
sions.97 Finally, failure to comply with the MOU may result in contract 
termination or suspension.98 
 One way that employers internalize the risk of such fines and sanc-
tions is by reducing wages.99 Generally, undocumented workers are paid 
ten to fifty-five percent less than their documented colleagues.100 This 
wage penalty has a direct impact on documented and native-born im-
migrants because employers are unsure of the employee’s work status.101 
C. Disparate Impact on Employees, Documented or Otherwise 
 Increasingly, employers must walk a tightrope as a result of en-
forcement activities.102 The decision of American Apparel Inc. to re-
duce its workforce by more than a quarter amid an investigation by 
immigration officials illustrates how employers are likely to react to 
such increased pressure.103 
                                                                                                                      
96 See Chichester & Adams, supra note 45, at 52. In fact, on July 1, 2009, ICE an-
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the country. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 652 Businesses 
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Cong. (2009) (statement of Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute). 
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102 See Cam Simpson, Obama Hones Immigration Policy, Wall St. J., July 21, 2009, at A6. 
103 See Miriam Jordan, American Apparel Sets Layoffs Tied to Probe, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 
2009, at B3 (indicating that American Apparel terminated 1500 of its 5600 employees after 
receiving notification from ICE that approximately 1600 employees were not employment 
eligible). 
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 Enforcement efforts promote defensive hiring practices.104 These 
practices typically result in the refusal to hire immigrants, documented 
or otherwise, because employers fear that they might mistakenly hire 
an undocumented immigrant and be subject to sanctions.105 In the case 
of E-Verify, the potential for such abuse arises where employers use the 
system to pre-screen new hires.106 Specifically, an employer may rely on 
query results—namely a TNC—to make hiring decisions.107 Because 
those who receive TNCs are disproportionately foreign-born, the dispa-
rate impact is especially striking.108 
 By stripping them of the opportunity to work, laws mandating the 
use of E-Verify deprive immigrants of the benefits of citizenship that 
facilitate belonging.109 Because immigrant workers buy goods from lo-
cally-owned stores, eat in local restaurants, and start new businesses, 
they generate approximately $700 billion in economic activity each 
year.110 Consequently, wrongly forcing them out of work will not only 
promote exceptionalism but will also disrupt the economy.111 
III. The Adoption of E-Verify as an Exercise of State 
Sovereignty 
 Traditionally, the focus of immigration law has been on issues of 
foreign affairs and national security.112 Recently, however, this focus 
shifted into the domestic sphere as states enter the immigration arena.113 
State legislatures across the country continue to introduce, pass, or con-
                                                                                                                      
104 See Anna Gorman, L.A. Employers Face Immigration Audits; Federal Agency Targets Hiring 
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105 See McKanders, supra note 40, at 589. 
106 See Inst. for Survey Research & Westat, Immigration and Nationalization 
Services Basic Pilot Evaluation Summary Report for U.S. Department of Justice 
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sider immigrant-related ordinances.114 In the first half of 2009, state legis-
lators in all fifty states introduced more than 1400 immigration related 
bills, surpassing last year’s totals.115 
 Among other contributing factors, two significant reasons form the 
foundation of this phenomenon.116 First, although the IRCA expressly 
forbids states from regulating unauthorized employment, it carves out 
an exception to preemption when a state regulates “licensing and simi-
lar laws.”117 Second, the federal government encouraged state assis-
tance in the enforcement of immigration laws after September 11, 
2001.118 Pursuant to agreements with ICE, the federal government 
delegated its immigration authority to state law enforcement officials, 
allowing them to investigate, arrest, and detain suspected violators.119 
 The advent of E-Verify has contributed to this distracting patch-
work of state laws, exacerbating the politics of exceptionalism.120 Sev-
eral states have sought to enact and enforce immigration laws under 
the guise of state police powers to protect the safety and welfare of their 
constituents.121 For instance, Janet Napolitano (former Arizona gover-
nor and current Secretary of Homeland Security) signed the Legal Ari-
zona Workers Act because it was “abundantly clear that Congress finds 
itself incapable of coping with the comprehensive immigration reform 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Immigrant Policy Project: 
State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration January 1–June 30, 2009, at 1 
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our country needs.”122 This is a classic example of a state exercising its 
sovereignty by legitimizing the exclusion of non-citizens.123 In so doing, 
the state endorses a bifurcated society structured around the notion of 
an “us” versus “them.”124 
A. Arizona: A Microcosm of State Enactment and Enforcement 
 The Legal Arizona Workers Act, enacted in 2007, requires all em-
ployers to use E-Verify to determine employment eligibility.125 The Act 
imposes a series of sanctions for violations ranging from the filing of 
quarterly reports of all new hires during a three-year probationary period 
to the suspension and revocation of the employer’s business license.126 
 Under the IRCA’s preemption provision, each state retains the 
right to regulate licensing laws.127 The Ninth Circuit, in Chicanos Por La 
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, upheld the constitutionality of the Act for pre-
cisely this reason.128 Relying on the IRCA provision, the court noted 
that the Arizona law does not attempt to define employment eligibility; 
rather, the federal immigration law standards provide the basis for the 
Act’s adoption.129 Additionally, the court found that even though par-
ticipation in E-Verify is voluntary at the federal level, the mandatory 
nature of the Arizona statute does not raise conflict preemption con-
cerns because Congress did not intend to prevent the states from mak-
ing it mandatory.130 Consequently, the court held that regulating em-
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ployment of undocumented workers is “within the mainstream” of the 
state’s police powers.131 
 Chicanos Por La Causa highlights the current transformation of 
immigration law away from border control matters and toward en-
forcement of employment law issues.132 Requiring cooperation with 
local police, it operates against the silent backdrop of national security 
concerns.133 As a result, enforcing immigration laws has become im-
plicit in the role of local law enforcement officials.134 
 A decentralized approach to enforcement of immigration laws by 
local police creates confusion between state and federal enforcement.135 
As highlighted in the case of the Moras, the sheriff of Maricopa County 
in Arizona, Joe Arpaio, has taken such a tough approach in enforcing 
immigration laws that federal officials are currently investigating his tac-
tics.136 His campaign of terror includes parading chain-ganged prisoners 
through downtown Phoenix in pink underwear and detaining them in 
army tents from the Korean War.137 Known for targeting anyone who 
merely looks Hispanic, his abusive practices are not confined to un-
documented migrants.138 In fact, the improper arrest and detention of 
Julio (a U.S. citizen) and Julian Mora (a legal resident) resulted from a 
workplace raid conducted by Arpaio.139 Notwithstanding the fact that 
the Department of Homeland Security stripped Arpaio’s deputies of 
their authority to enforce immigration laws, he remains defiant.140 His 
                                                                                                                      
131 Id. at 864 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976)); see also De Canas, 
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express goal is to “catch them coming through.”141 To that end, he will 
continue to arrest suspected immigrants “for cracked windshields, loose 
tailpipes, or whatever,” and then verify their citizenship status under 
state laws.142 
B. The Enactment and Enforcement of Unilateral State Immigration Laws 
Mandating the Use of E-Verify Undermines Efficiency 
 The complex web of city, county, and state laws governing em-
ployment verification standards undermines efficient immigration en-
forcement.143 Local enforcement of laws mandating the use of E-Verify 
necessarily leads to a diversion of a state’s already limited resources.144 
A recent study, comparing the immigration policies of the United 
States with that of other countries, revealed that laws enforcing closed-
door policies invariably lead to stagnation.145 In the case of E-Verify, 
fragmented state policies interfere with the federal government’s ability 
to implement comprehensive immigration reform.146 
 The fact that E-Verify disproportionately misidentifies those who 
are foreign-born could lead to the development of a subclass of immi-
grants.147 In Plyer v. Doe, the Supreme Court contemplated the develop-
ment of this subclass.148 While the Plyer Court dealt with the status of 
immigrant children, its rationale can arguably be applied to the immi-
grant community at large.149 While some undocumented immigrants 
may leave the country altogether, many will remain indefinitely.150 
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Those that remain will then flood states with seemingly pro-immigrant 
laws, raising the potential for political turmoil in that state.151 The end 
result is that certain localities will have a concentrated population of 
undocumented immigrants, who would otherwise be spread across the 
country.152 The advent of a subordinated class of immigrants would only 
“add[] to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and 
crime.”153 Consequently, the long-term costs outweigh the perceived 
short-term benefits of enacting and enforcing stringent immigration 
laws.154 
IV. The Role of Congress 
 The proliferation of local immigration laws highlights the need for 
congressional overhaul of federal immigration system so that “local 
communities do not take matters into their own hands.”155 To realign 
immigration reform with the goals of efficiency and economy, Congress 
should establish clear boundaries over which level of government 
should regulate immigration.156 
A. Immigration Federalism 
 There are three models that balance the level of state and federal 
regulation of immigration: a) federal exclusivity; b) state and local co-
operation; and c) state and local regulation.157 The federal exclusivity 
model precludes states from enacting their own immigration laws.158 
On the opposite end of the scale is the state and local regulatory 
scheme, which encourages enactment and enforcement of immigration 
laws under states’ inherent police power to protect the general welfare 
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of their people.159 Meanwhile, the cooperative model lies somewhere in 
between these extremes.160 Under this model, the federal government 
has the exclusive power to enact and enforce immigration policies; but, 
it may seek state and local assistance as needed.161 
 The federal exclusivity model reinforces the notion that the power 
to regulate immigration lies exclusively with Congress.162 Although it is 
not expressly stated in the Constitution, scholars agree that the immi-
gration power is a derivative of the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign 
Affairs Clauses, and the Commerce Clause.163 When considered in con-
junction with the Supremacy Clause, which states that the federal law is 
the “Supreme Law of the Land,” it seems that Congress has the upper 
hand in the immigration arena.164 
 The line between federal and state authority, however, is blurred 
when the federal government remains silent and states rely on their 
Tenth Amendment police powers to pass laws aimed at immigrants.165 
States’ exercise of the Tenth Amendment police powers is especially 
troublesome where, as in the case of E-Verify, local immigration laws are 
enacted with the pretense of protecting the safety and welfare of those 
communities.166 Instead, the true purpose of such laws is to encourage 
immigrants to relocate or self-deport.167 
 Congress should embrace the cooperative model and enact laws 
that clearly circumscribe the role of state and local governments with 
respect to immigration.168 When federal statutes “explicitly command[] 
that state law be displaced,” there is no doubt that states are kept out of 
the immigration arena.169 Enforcement of federal immigration laws 
would nevertheless be permissible when the federal government re-
quests it.170 Under no circumstances, then, would states be able to enact 
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laws, like the Legal Arizona Workers Act, mandating the use of E-Verify 
to target immigrants.171 
Conclusion 
 Passed under the Procurement Act, the goal of E-Verify was to 
promote efficiency and economy. At both the federal and state levels, 
however, E-Verify leaves workers vulnerable to subjective determina-
tions about their legal status and therefore, promotes exceptionalism. 
The complex web woven by state immigration laws, including a man-
date to use E-Verify, has only compounded the reach of the system’s 
problems—inaccurate databases, disproportionate costs on employers, 
and disparate impact on immigrants. Moreover, the proliferation of 
these laws has also empowered local law enforcement officials to use 
draconian tactics, such as workplace raids, to weed out undocumented 
workers. Because these measures often unfairly target legal workers and 
disrupt workplace dynamics, they undermine the Procurement Act’s 
goals of efficiency and economy. 
 To realign E-Verify with the goals of the Procurement Act, Con-
gress must overhaul the federal immigration system by establishing de-
finitive boundaries between state and federal regulation of immigra-
tion. One way to do this is to adopt a cooperative immigration model, 
which limits state involvement in the immigration arena. Under this 
model, states would have no authority to enact their own immigration 
laws. In fact, the only avenue by which states could enter the immigra-
tion arena is through the enforcement of federal laws. Notably, under 
the cooperative model, even those activities would be contingent on a 
federal call for assistance. 
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